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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
JOHN SOUZA and 
PARADISE MEDIA VENTURES, LLC 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
DR. JEFFREY GALLUPS, MILTON HALL 
SURGfCAL CENTER, LLC d/b/a ENT 
INSTITUTE, and JOHN BERBERIAN 
Defendants. 
CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 
2016CV275265 
Business Case Div. 2 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The above styled matter is before the Court on: (1) Defendants Dr. Jeffrey Gallups and 
Milton Hall Surgical Associates, LLC's (collectively the "Gallups Defendants") Motion for 
Summary Judgment; and (2) Defendant John Berberian's Motion for Summary Judgment or 
Alternatively to Strike Allegations or Alternatively for Judgment on the Pleadings. Having 
considered the entire record, the Court finds as follows: 
SUMMARY 
Defendant Dr. Jeffrey Gallups ("Gallups") is a medical doctor and the Chief Executive 
Officer of Defendant Milton Hall Surgical Associates, LLC d/b/a ENT Institute ("ENT 
Institute"), an otolaryngology practice that provides ear, nose, and throat related medical 
services.' Plaintiff John Souza ("Souza") is a former investment bank finance executive and 
Defendants Dr. Jeffrey GaUups and Milton Hall Surgical Associates, LLC's Statement of Undisputed 
Material Facts as to Which No Genuinelssue Exists ("Gallups Defs' SMF"), iJI; Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants 
Dr. Jeffrey Gallups and Milton Hall Surgical Associates, LLC's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts and 
Statement of Additional Material Facts ("Pis' Resp. to Gallups Defs' SMF"), p. 2 at iJI; Defendant John Berberian's 
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts as lo Which There is No Genuine Issue to Be Tried and Theories of 
entrepreneur who assists businesses in developing growth strategies.' Co-Plaintiff Paradise 
Media Ventures, LLC ("Paradise") is Souza's wholly-owned company.3 
Souza and Gallups met in early 2013 and thereafter discussed ideas and opportunities to 
grow the ENT Institute's practice." Souza had an acquaintance, Defendant John Berberian 
("Berberian"), who was a marketer for WellCorpRx LLC ("WellCorpRx").5 According to Souza, 
Berberian claimed to have a lucrative "allergy business" in Los Angeles and the two began 
discussing potential business opportunities with ENT [nstitute.6 Souza asserts he later learned 
that Berberian was actually operating as a distributor for United Allergy Services ("UAS).7 
Souza contends Berberian misrepresented WellCorpRx's capacity to serve as an allergy services 
provider to hide allegedly the conflict of interest posed by Berberian's commission agreement 
with UAS. 
In June of 2014, Souza had Gallups and Berberian each sign nearly identical non- 
disclosure agreements ("NOA" or "NDAs"). Gallups signed the NOA on behalf of ENT Institute 
and Berberian signed the NDA on behalf of WellCorpRx.8 The NDAs state that ENT Institute 
and WellCorpRx, respectively, would not "attempt to do business with, or otherwise solicit any 
business contact or relationship created or referred by [Paradise] during the term of [the] 
agreement" and would not disclose any "confidential information" as defined under the NDAs. 
That same month, Souza introduced Gallups and Berberian and the three began discussing 
6 
7 
8 
Recovery ("Def Berberian's SMF"), p. 3 at iJ5; Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant Berberian's Statement of 
Undisputed Material Facts and Statement of Additional Material Facts ("Pis' Resp. to Def Berberian's SMF"), p. 3 
at ,is, p. 14 at iJ9. 
2 Gallups Defs' SMF, i]3; Pis' Resp. to Gallups Defs' SMF, p. 2 at i]3, p. 12 at i]9. 
3 Gallups Defs' SMF, i]3; Pis' Resp. to Gallups Defs' SMF, p. 2 ati]3. 
4 Gallups Defs' SMF, i]4; Pis' Resp. to Gallups Defs' SMF, p. 3 at i14. 
Id.; DefBerberian's SMF, i]4. 
Pis' Resp. to DefBerberiao's SMF, p. 11 atilt. 
Pis' Resp. to Def Berberian's SMF, p. 12-13 at i1s. 
Gallups Defs' SMF, ,i,i 5-6; Pis' Resp. to Gallups Defs' SMF, pp. 3-4 at ili] 5-6; Def Berberian's SMF, iJ4; 
Pis' Resp. to Def Berberian's SMF, pp. 2-3 at iJ4, p. 14-15 atiMI 11-12, pp. 19-20 atiJi]25-26. 
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opportunities involving the provision of allergy testing services to ENT lnstitute.9 
Souza asserts that during discussions with Gallups and Berberian the parties discussed the 
possible implementation of allergy services at ENT Institute through Berberian's company (a 
revenue-sharing arrangement whereby ENT Institute would pay Souza and Berberian) and the 
potential for nationwide expansion of the program if it was successful. 10 Souza also allegedly 
introduced to Gallups and Berberian a plan whereby Gallups could triage his current patients into 
allergy and immunotherapy in addition to his existing practice.11 Souza asserts his "plan" was for 
ENT Institute to serve as a pilot program for integrating allergy testing and immunotherapy 
services into ENT practices before expanding the program nationally if it proved to be 
successful. 12 
The parties communicated throughout the summer of 2014 and Souza, Berberian, and 
Gallups allegedly met in July 2014 to discuss the "details of their business plan."13 Souza claims 
that at that meeting it was agreed that WellcorpRx would provide allergy testing services for the 
"deal" and that WellcorpRx would provide more than $500,000 in funding for the project.14 The 
parties also allegedly confirmed that ENT Institute would pay a portion of revenue derived from 
allergy testing services provided by WellcorpRx to a management service organization ("MSO") 
which would then pay Souza and Berberian.15 Souza claims that in subsequent communications 
he also disclosed his ideas about identifying practice locations, the timeline for rolling out the 
new services, revenue growth targets, and physician compensation.16 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Gallups Defs' SMF, ,is; Pis' Resp. to Gallups Defs' SMF, p. 3-4 at ,is; Def Berberian's SMF, i12. 
Pis' Resp. to Def Berberian's SMF, p. 3 al il6, p. 16 at ,its. 
Pis' Resp. to DefBerberian's SMF, p. 16 at,]16. 
Pis' Resp. to DefBerberian's SMF, p. 17 atill7. 
Pis' Resp. to DefBerberian's SMF, p. 20 at il27. 
Id. 
Id. 
Pis' Resp. to Def Berberian's SMF, p. 21 at i12s. 
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Berberian formed Pinnacle MSO, LLC ("Pinnacle") on August 21, 2014 but listed 
himself as the sole member.17 Pinnacle entered into an agreement with ENT Institute on 
September 13, 2014, under which Pinnacle would be compensated based on the services 
provided by UAS to ENT lnstitute ("Pinnacle MSO Agreement"). 18 On September 29, 2014, 
ENT Institute and UAS entered into an allergy services agreement under which ENT Institute's 
practices began to provide allergy services through UAS.19 During this period and for months 
thereafter the parties continued to discuss and negotiate various terms of their business 
arrangement and other opportunities (including genetic testing services and a medical food 
program) and exchanged various draft agreements. However, through the rest of 2014 and into 
2015 the parties' discussions and business relationship continued to devolve and ultimately no 
final agreement was ever reached as to Souza's interest in any business arrangement or in any 
entity. 
Nevertheless, Souza maintains that he, Gallups, and Berberian "entered a joint venture in 
which Souza was chief strategist and whereby Souza and Berberian would be compensated 
through the Pinnacle MSO for revenues [ENT Institute] generated through its arrangement with 
UAS."20 According to Souza, Berberian misrepresented the role of WellCorpRx and UAS in 
order to have a larger stake in the venture, admitted to third parties that he had no intention of 
paying Souza per the parties' arrangement, often did not respond to Souza's requests for updates, 
and at some point began actively working to exclude Souza from the deal." 
17 Gallups Defs' SMF, ~7; Pis' Resp. to Gallups Defs' SMF, p. 4 at ~7; Pis' Resp. to Def Berberian's SMF, 
pp. 3-4 at ~8. 
18 Gallups Defs' SMF, ~8; Pis' Resp. to Gallups Defs' SMF, p. 5 at i!8; Pis' Resp. to Def Berberian's SMF, 
pp. 3-4 at fnl 8-9. 
19 Pis' Resp. to Gallups Defs' SMF, p. 51 at ~I 10. 
20 Pis' Resp. to Gallups Defs' SMF, pp. 8-9 at iMJ 14-15. 
21 See, e.g., Pis' Resp. to Gallups Defs' SMF, p. 12 at il3, p. 13 at il6, p. 20 at i121, p. 21 at ipo. p. 26 at iJ43, 
p. 29 at 151, pp. 33-36 at iMJ62-66, p. 46 at 193. 
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Souza alleges Berberian profited from his business arrangement with the Gallups 
Defendants through funds Berberian's holding company (non-party JBJB Holdings) received 
from Pinnacle and through commissions he received from UAS.22 Souza asserts the Gallups 
Defendants also profited from ENT lnstitute's implementation of the UAS allergy services 
program23 while "Souza received nothing for the work he performed for the joint venture.T'" 
Procedural History 
Souza initially sued Berberian and Pinnacle in a separate action that was filed on 
February 27, 2015 ("2015 Action").25 Based on most of the same allegations summarized above, 
Souza asserted the following claims in the 2015 Action: (l) declaratory judgment (seeking a 
declaration that Souza "is a full member of (Pinnacle] with a twenty-one [sic] ownership 
interest")26; (2) breach of contract and specific performance (alleging Defendants breached "the 
parties' agreement. .. by failing to make any payments of the funds received from the Gallups 
practice" and seeking specific performance "requiring Defendant (unless he is removed from 
power) to make the payments as agreed")"; (3) breach of fiduciary duty (alleging that "(a]s the 
majority member in [Pinnacle], Defendant owe[d] Plaintiff a fiduciary duty" but instead 
Defendant had "operated and controlled [Pinnacle] for his own benefit to the detriment of Souza" 
and "acted to deprive Souza of his membership interest"/8; ( 4) accounting (seeking an equitable 
and legal accounting of all funds relating to Pinnacler'"; (5) tortious deprivation of interest/quasi- 
conversion (aJleging "Defendant" had "intentionally deprived Souza of his membership interest 
22 Pis' Resp. to Gallups Defs' SMF, p. 50 atrl1105-106. 
Pis' Resp. to Gallups Defs' SMF, pp. 50-51 at ii1I07-L08. 
Pis' Resp. to Gallups Defs' SMF, p. 51 at~l09. 
Souza v. Berberian et al., Superior Court ofFulton County, No. 20 I 5CV257652. 
2015 Action, Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Breach of Contract, Specific Performance, 
Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Tortious Deprivation, Attorney's Fees, and Punitive Damages ("2015 Action 
Complaint"), i]49. 
27 2015 Action Complaint, ilil 53-56. 
28 2015 Action Complaint, ilil 58-61. 
29 2015 Action Complaint, il66. 
23 
25 
26 
5 
m Pinnacle'Y"; (6) attorney's fees'"; (7) punitive damages32; (8) breach of fiduciary duty 
(alleging "Berberian had a duty to disclose all material information to Souza and failed to do 
so")33; (9) unjust enrichment and quantum meruit (alleging "Berberian and ENT Institute have 
been enrichment while [Souza] has not been compensated a single dollar" and that Souza "is 
entitled to be compensated for the value of his services'T"; (10) breach of contract (alleging 
Berberian breached the NDA)35. 
In the 2015 Action, this Court granted judgment as a matter of law to Berberian and 
Pinnacle on all claims other than those for unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and attorney's 
fees. Souza filed a Notice of Appeal; the Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed this Court's 
ruling.36 Specifically, the appellate court held summary judgment was proper on all of Souza's 
"contract-based claims", finding "the parties' continued negotiations demonstrate[d] that they 
had not reached agreement on all material terms" and the record "d[id] not show with reasonable 
certainty what the parties intended to do."37 The appellate court also affirmed summary judgment 
on Souza's claim for breach of the NOA, finding that contract was between Paradise and 
WellCorpRx, both non-parties to the 2015 Action, and that tbe NDA "on its face did not prohibit 
the conduct of Berberian and Souza individually.v" 
On May 16, 2016 (six days after Souza filed his Notice of Appeal in the 2015 Action), 
Souza and Paradise initiated this lawsuit against the Gallups Defendants. Upon receipt of the 
Court of Appeals' Remittitur, the 2015 Action and the case at bar proceeded separately but in 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
3S 
2015 Action Complaint, i]68. 
2015 Action Complaint, ,i,i 70- 71. 
2015 Action Complaint, ,i,i 73-74. 
2015 Action, Firsl Amended Complaint, ,i,i 4, 1 I, 16-19. 
2015 Action, First Amended Complaint, ,i,i 25-26. 
2015 Action, First Amended Complaint, ,i,i 29-35. 
See generally Souza v. Berberian, 342 Ga. App. 165, 165, 802 S.E.2d 40 I, 402 (2017). 
Id. at 168-69. 
Id. at 169- 70. 
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tandem until December 8, 2017 when Souza voluntarily dismissed without prejudice the 2015 
Action. On January 25, 2018, by consent order Berberian was added to this lawsuit as a party 
Defendant. Plaintiffs then filed a Second Amended Complaint on May 4, 2018, asserting the 
following claims: (l) unjust enrichment/quantum meruit (against the Gallups Defendants); (2) 
unjust enrichment/quantum meruit (against Berberian); (3) fraud (against Berberian); (4) 
promissory estoppel (against all Defendants); (5) breach of fiduciary duty (against all 
Defendants); (6) attorney's fees (against all Defendants); and (7) punitive damages (against all 
Defendants). 
In the instant motions, the Gallups Defendants and Berberian, respectively, move for 
summary judgment as to all claims asserted against them. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Standard on Motion for Summary Judgment 
Summary judgment should be granted only when the movant shows "that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law." O.C.G.A. § 9-l l-56(c). "A defendant may do this by showing the court that the 
documents, affidavits, depositions and other evidence in the record reveal that there is no 
evidence sufficient to create a jury issue on at least one essential element of plaintiffs case." 
Scarbrough v. Hallam, 240 Ga. App. 829, 830, 525 S.E.2d 377, 378 (1999) (quoting Lau's Corp. 
v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491,491,405 S.E.2d 474, 475-76 (1991). To avoid summary judgment, "an 
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, 
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in (O.C.G.A. §9-11-56], must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." O.C.G.A. §9-l l-56(e). 
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"[A]t the summary judgment stage, courts are required to construe the evidence most 
favorably towards the nonmoving party, who is given the benefit of all reasonable doubts and 
possible inferences." Smith v. Tenet Health Sys. Spalding. Inc., 327 Ga. App. 878, 879, 761 
S.E.2d 409, 411 (2014) (citations and punctuation omitted). See Word v. Henderson, 220 Ga. 
846, 848, 142 S.E.2d 244,246 (1965) ("Where the evidence on motion for summary judgment is 
ambiguous or doubtful, the party opposing the motion must be given the benefit of all reasonable 
doubts and of all favorable inferences and such evidence construed most favorably to the 
opposing party opposing the motion"). However, "(m]ere speculation, conjecture, or possibility 
[are] insufficient to preclude summary judgment." State v. Rozier, 288 Ga. 767, 768 (2011) 
(quoting Rosales v. Davis, 260 Ga. App. 709, 712, 580 S.E.2d 662, 665 (2003)); see Pafford v. 
Biomet, 264 Ga. 540, 544, 448 S.E.2d 347, 350 (1994); Ellison v. Burger King Corp., 294 Ga. 
App. 814,819,670 S.E.2d 469,474 (2008). 
B. Federal Anti-Kickback Act, 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7b(b) 
Although not addressed in Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and their related 
briefs, at a January 15, 2019 summary judgment hearing before this Court, Defendant Berberian 
asserted for the first time that a federal anti-kickback statute, 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7b(b), precluded 
Plaintiffs' requested relief in this action. 
Sometimes referred to as the "Anti-Kickback" or "Medicare fraud" statute, this federal 
law generally prohibits the payment or receipt of any remuneration to induce referrals to 
healthcare providers for services paid in whole or in part by federal healthcare programs unless 
the remuneration falls within established exceptions or "safe harbors." See generally 42 U.S.C. 
§1320a-7b(b); see, e.g., United States v. Borrasi, 639 F.3d 774, 782 (7th Cir. 2011); U.S. ex rel. 
Obert-Hong v. Advocate Health Care, 211 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1048 (N.D. Ill. 2002); U.S. ex rel. 
Obert-Hong v. Advocate Health Care, 211 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1048 (N.D. Ill. 2002); U.S. ex rel. 
8 
Conner v. Salina Reg'l Health Ctr., Inc., 459 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090 (D. Kan. 2006). Because in 
this litigation Plaintiffs seek compensation in equity (unjust enrichment/quantum meruit) for the 
role they played in bringing the UAS/ENT Institute/Pinnacle business arrangement to fruition 
and seek their share of fees that went through Pinnacle and/or UAS for the allergy testing 
referrals contemplated under that arrangement, Defendants argue Plaintiffs do not fall under any 
statutory safe harbor and their requested relief is prohibited by the federal Anti-Kickback statute. 
Following the hearing, the Court allowed the parties an opportunity to brief the issue. 
Having considered the supplemental briefs that have been submitted, the Court agrees with 
Plaintiffs that raising the issue for the first time at the sununary judgment hearing was improper 
in that it denied Plaintiffs fair notice and an opportunity to develop a factual record, particularly 
given that the matter was first raised after discovery closed and depositions had already been 
taken. 
[A] purpose of the requirement that affirmative defenses be pleaded is to 
prevent surprise and to give the opposing party fair notice of what must be 
met as a defense. To allow a party to raise the issue for the first time orally 
at a hearing on a summary judgment motion without any notice to the 
opposing party is contrary to this rationale. 
Hansford v. Robinson, 255 Ga. 530,530,340 S.E.2d 614,615 (1986) (citation omitted). 
Because Defendants did not timely raise any defense under the Anti-Kickback statute, it 
cannot be the basis for awarding summary judgment. Moreover, it appears that only some of the 
allergy services provided through the UAS/ENT Institute/Pinnacle business arrangement were 
paid through federal health care programs and may be implicated under the federal statute. Thus, 
the statue would not be entirely dispositive of the claims and issues before the Court even if 
properly raised. 
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C. Gallups Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
1. Claims asserted against Gallups, Individually 
The Court finds that all claims asserted against Gallups individually fail as a matter of 
law as the record demonstrates that Gallups' interactions with Plaintiffs were carried out in his 
capacity as Chief Executive Officer and on behalf of ENT Institute. See O.C.G.A. § 14-10- 7(b) 
("[T]he members or shareholders of any professional association organized pursuant to this 
chapter shall not be individually liable for the debts of, or claims against, the professional 
association unless such member or shareholder has personally participated in the transaction for 
which the debt or claim is made or out of which it arises"). See also Earnest v. Merck, 183 Ga. 
App. 271,273,358 S.E.2d 661,663 (1987) ("All corporate bodies perforce must operate through 
individuals. The mere operation of corporate business does not render one personally liable for 
corporate acts ... The corporate veil may be pierced where the parties themselves have 
disregarded the separateness of legal entities by commingling on an interchangeable or joint 
basis or confusing the otherwise separate properties, records or control") ( citing Trans-State. Inc. 
v. Barber, 170 Ga. App. 372, 374, 317 S.E.2d 242, 244 (1984)). Accordingly, summary 
judgment is GRANTED to Defendant Gallups as to all claims asserted against him individually. 
2. Claims asserted against ENT Institute 
a. Unjust Enrichment and Quantum Meruit 
"[U]njust enrichment applies when as a matter of fact there is no legal contract ... but 
where the party sought to be charged has been conferred a benefit by the party contending an 
unjust enrichment which the benefited party equitably ought to return or compensate for." 
Engram v. Engram, 265 Ga. 804,806,463 S.E.2d 12, 15 (1995) (quoting Smith v. McClung, 215 
Ga. App. 786, 789(3), 452 S.E.2d 229 (1994)). 
10 
"The theory of unjust enrichment is basically an equitable doctrine that the 
benefitted party equitably ought to either return or compensate for the 
conferred benefits when there was no legal contract to pay." (Citations 
omitted.) Hollifield v. Monte Vista Biblical Gardens, 25 l Ga.App. 124, 
130(2)(c), 553 S.E.2d 662 (2001). "The concept of unjust enrichment in 
law is premised upon the principle that a party cannot induce, accept, or 
encourage another to furnish or render something of value to such party 
and avoid payment for the value received." (Citation and punctuation 
omitted.) Id. at 131(2)(c), 553 S.E.2d 662. For unjust enrichment to apply, 
"the party conferring the labor and things of value must act with the 
expectation that the other will be responsible for the cost." Id. Otherwise, 
that party, like one who volunteers to pay the debt of another, has no right 
to an equitable recovery. Id. 
Morris v. Britt, 275 Ga. App. 293, 294, 620 S.E.2d 422, 424 (2005). "[A] claim for unjust 
enrichment is not a tort, but an alternative theory of recovery if a contract claim fails." Wachovia 
Ins. Servs .. Inc. v. Fallon, 299 Ga. App. 440,449, 682 S.E.2d 657,665 (2009) (quoting Tidikis v. 
Network for Med., etc., 274 Ga. App. 807, 811(2), 619 S.E.2d 481 (2005)). 
The essential elements for a quantum meruit claim are: "( 1) the performance of valuable 
services; (2) accepted by the recipient or at his request; (3) the failure to compensate the provider 
would be unjust; and (4) the provider expected compensation at the time services were 
rendered." Amend v. 485 Properties, 280 Ga. 327, 329, 627 S.E.2d 565, 567 (2006) (citation 
omitted). "Quantum meruit, unlike unjust enrichment, relies upon an implied promise of 
compensation." Cochran v. Ogletree, 244 Ga. App. 537, 539, 536 S.E.2d 194, 197 (2000). See 
Watson v. Sie1Ta Contracting Corp., 226 Ga. App. 21, 28, 485 S.E.2d 563, 570 (1997) 
(''Quantum meruit is not available when there is an express contract; however, if the contract is 
void, is repudiated, or can only be implied, then quantum meruit will allow a recovery if the 
work or service was accepted and if it had value to the recipient"). 
Here, it is undisputed that Souza introduced Gallups and Berberian with the intent of 
discussing and pursuing potential business opportunities. There is evidence in the record that for 
several months between June 2014 and February 2015, Souza participated in various meetings 
I I 
and discussions with the Gallups Defendants and Berberian as well as their respective agents to 
negotiate and develop those business opportunities. Plaintiffs allege Souza introduced to the 
Gallups Defendants and Berberian a plan for ENT lnstitute to triage patients into allergy and 
immunotherapy services and also shared his plan for the Gallups Defendants to serve as a pilot 
program for integrating allergy testing and immunotherapy services into ENT practices before 
expanding the program nationally if it proved to be successful. Plaintiffs also claim that Souza 
disclosed his ideas about identifying practice locations, the tirneline for rolling out the new 
services, revenue growth targets, and physician compensation.39 
Although no enforceable agreement was ever reached as to Souza's interest in the 
business arrangements being discussed, the parties' communications plainly indicate an intent 
that Souza would be compensated in some fashion. Ultimately UAS provided allergy testing 
services to the ENT lnstitute's practices and Berberian and the ENT Institute profited as a result. 
Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court finds triable issues 
remain as to Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment/quantum meruit claim. Accordingly, summary 
judgment is DENIED with respect to those claims as asserted against Defendant ENT. 
b. Promissory estoppel 
"In Georgia, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is codified at O.C.G.A. § 13-3-44." 
Hendon Properties, LLC v. Cinema Dev., LLC, 275 Ga. App. 434, 438, 620 S.E.2d 644, 649 
(2005). That code section provides in relevant part: 
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action 
or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which 
does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be 
avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for 
breach may be limited as justice requires. 
O.C.G.A. § l 3-3-44(a). 
39 Pis' Resp. to DefBerberian's SMF, p. 21 at iJ28. 
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Thus, "[t]o prevail on a promissory estoppel claim, plaintiffs must show that 
(1) defendant made certain promises, (2) defendant should have expected that plaintiffs would 
rely on such promises, (3) the plaintiffs did in fact rely on such promises to their detriment, and 
(4) injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." Sparra v. Deutsche Bank Nat. 
Tr. Co., 336 Ga. App. 418, 421, 785 S.E.2d 78, 83 (2016) (quoting Canterbury forest Assn. v. 
Collins, 243 Ga.App. 425, 428(2), 532 S.E.2d 736 (2000)). Importantly, "a claim predicated on a 
theory of promissory estoppel may lie even though the promise was made in a contract that is not 
legally enforceable." Hendon Properties, LLC, 275 Ga. App. at 439 (citations omitted). See also 
Davidson v. Maraj, 609 F. App'x 994, 1001 (11th Cir. 2015) ("A promise enforceable by 
promissory estoppel 'need not meet the formal requirements of a contract,' but 'it must, 
nonetheless, have been communicated with sufficient particularity to enforce the commitment"') 
(quoting Mooney v. Mooney, 245 Ga. App. 780, 538 S.E.2d 864, 868 (2000)). 
Here, although no enforceable agreement establishing Souza's interest in any venture was 
reached and this Court has previously found the NDA unenforceable against the Gallups 
Defendants, the Court finds questions of material fact preclude summary judgment on Plaintiffs' 
promissory estoppel claim. Plaintiffs allege that, through the NDA and during the course of the 
parties' dealings, the ENT Institute promised that it would not attempt to do business with, or 
otherwise solicit any business contact or relationship created or referred by Paradise during the 
term of the NDA. Plaintiffs claim that based on that promise and to their detriment Souza 
dedicated his time and efforts developing the planned venture whereby UAS would provide 
allergy testing services to the ENT Institute. The record presents a jury question as to this claim. 
Accordingly, summary judgment is DENIED to Defendant ENT Institute on Plaintiffs' claim for 
promissory estoppel. 
13 
c. Breach of 'fiduciary duty 
"It is well settled that a claim for breach of fiduciary duty requires proof of three 
elements: (I) the existence of a fiduciary duty; (2) breach of that duty; and (3) damage 
proximately caused by the breach." Engelman v. Kessler, 340 Ga. App. 239, 246, 797 S.E.2d 
l60, 166 (2017) (quoting Nash v. Studdard, 294 Ga. App. 845, 849-850 (2), 670 S.E.2d 508 
(2008)). "(A] fiduciary duty exists 'where one party is so situated as to exercise a controlling 
influence over the will, conduct, and interest of another or where, from a similar relationship of 
mutual confidence, the law requires the utmost good faith, such as the relationship between 
partners, principal, and agent, etc."' Maree v. ROMAR Joint Venture, 329 Ga. App. 282, 297, 
763 S.E.2d 899, 911 (2014) (citing O.C.G.A. §23-2-58). 
A confidential relationship may exist between business people, depending 
on the facts. However, the mere circumstance that two people have come 
to repose a certain amount of trust and confidence in each other as the 
result of business dealings is not, in and of itself, sufficient to find the 
existence of a confidential relationship. 
Parello v. Maio, 268 Ga. 852, 853, 494 S.E.2d 331, 333 (1998) ( citations omitted); O'Neal v. 
Home Town Bank of Villa Rica, 237 Ga. App. 325, 330, 514 S.E.2d 669, 675 (1999) (accord). 
See, e.g., Bums v. Dees, 252 Ga. App. 598, 607, 557 S.E.2d 32, 39 (2001) (where long time 
employee sued the estate of his deceased employer based on an alleged "joint venture 
relationship", affirming summary judgment against the employee on his breach of fiduciary duty 
claim where record did not reflect any enforceable joint venture contract and the employee did 
not demonstrate the existence of either the contract or a fiduciary relationship which might 
establish the employer's duties). 
Here, the record simply does not demonstrate a confidential or fiduciary relationship 
between Souza and the Gallup Defendants or between Souza and Berberian. Gal1ups and 
Berberian were Souza's professional acquaintances. During the relevant period the parties were 
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discussing and negotiating, at times acrimoniously, a potential business relationship that 
ultimately never resulted in any final agreement on material terms as to any business relationship 
in which Souza had an interest." Thus, summary judgment is GRANTED to Defendant ENT 
Institute on the breach of fiduciary duty claim. 
d. Attorney's Fees 
Insofar as substantive claims remain for adjudication against Defendant ENT Institute, 
Plaintiffs' "derivative" claim for an award of attorney's fees and costs also survives. See Racette 
v. Bank of Am., N.A., 318 Ga. App. 171, 181, 733 S.E.2d 457, 466 (2012); DaimlerChrysler 
Motors Co. v. Clemente, 294 Ga. App. 38, 52(5), 668 S.E.2d 737 (2008). Summary judgment is 
DENIED to Defendant ENT Institute on the claim for attorney's fees. 
e. Punitive Damages 
Given the Court's rulings above, the only substantive claims that remain against 
Defendant ENT Institute are Plaintiffs' claims for unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and 
promissory estoppel. Because all of these claims sound in equity and/or contract and none sound 
in tort or raise issues of willful misconduct or fraud, Plaintiffs' claim against ENT Institute for 
punitive damages fails as a matter of law. See O.C.G.A. §51-12-5.l(b) ("Punitive damages may 
be awarded only in such tort actions in which it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that 
the defendant's actions showed willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or 
that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to 
consequences"). See, e.g., Layer v. Clipper Petroleum, Inc., 319 Ga. App. 410, 420, 735 S.E.2d 
~o See, e.g., Smilh Serv. Oil Co. v. Parker, 250 Ga. App. 270, 270-71, 549 S.E.2d 485, 486 (200 I) ("Unless 
an agreement is reached as to all terms and conditions and nothing is left to future negotiations, a contract to enter 
into a contract in the future is of no effect") (quoting Hartrampf v. C & S Realty Investors, 157 Ga. App. 879, 
881(1), 278 S.E.2d 750 (1981)); Coch.ran v. Ogletree, 244 Ga. App. 537,538,536 S.E.2d 194, 196 (2000) ("(T]he 
writing was formative in nature only, i.e., a promise to make an agreement. No binding contract ever came into 
existence, because it is well settled that an agreement between two parties wiU occur only when the minds of the 
parties meet at the same time, upon the same subject-matter, and in the same sense") (citation punctuation omitted). 
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65, 74 (2012) (affirming summary judgment on punitive damages claim where plaintiffs 
"complaint for breach of contract, quantum meruit and breach of the [implied] covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing raised contract claims only" and plaintiff "pointed to no evidence of 
fraud"); Parsells v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 172 Ga. App. 74, 75, 322 S.E.2d 91, 93 ( l 984) 
(holding punitive damages were unavailable where the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a cause of · 
action in fraud). Thus, summary judgment is GRANTED to ENT Institute on the punitive 
damages claim. 
D. Defendant Berberian's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Defendant Berberian, here, moves for summary judgment as to all claims asserted against 
him. In addition to raising many of tbe same arguments asserted by the Gallups Defendants in 
their summary judgment motion, Berberian also argues Georgia's preclusion doctrines bar 
Plaintiffs' claims. 
I. Collateral estoppel and res judicata 
Based on this Court's and the appellate court's rulings in the 20 I 5 Action, Berberian 
asserts collateral estoppel and/or res judicata bars all claims against him in this action related to 
any purported contractual obligations, including the formation of any business. 
The doctrine of res judicata prevents the re-litigation of all claims which 
have already been adjudicated, or which could have been adjudicated, 
between identical parties or their privies in identical causes of action. Res 
judicata prevents a plaintiff from instituting a second complaint against a 
defendant on a claim that has already been brought, after having 
previously been adjudged not to be entitled to the recovery sought on that 
claim. Three prerequisites must be satisfied before res judicata applies-( 1) 
identity of the cause of action, (2) identity of the parties or their privies, 
and (3) previous adjudication on the merits by a court of competent 
jurisdiction. 
Karan. Inc. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 280 Ga. 545, 546, 629 S.E.2d 260, 262 (2006). See 
O.C.G.A. §9-12-40 ("A judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be conclusive 
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between the same parties and their privies as to all matters put in issue or which under the rules 
of law might have been put in issue in the cause wherein the judgment was rendered until the 
judgment is reversed or set aside"). 
[T]he related doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes the re-adjudication 
of an issue that has previously been litigated and adjudicated on the merits 
in another action between the same parties or their privies. Like res 
judicata, collateraJ estoppel requires the identity of the parties or their 
privies in both actions. However, unlike res judicata, collateral estoppel 
does not require identity of the claim-so long as the issue was 
determined in the previous action and there is identity of the parties, that 
issue may not be re-litigated, even as part of a different claim. 
Etowah Envtl. Grp., LLC v. Walsh, 333 Ga. App. 464, 469-70, 774 S.E.2d 220, 225 (2015) 
(quoting Body of Christ Overcoming Church of God v. Brinson, 287 Ga. 485, 486, 696 S.E.2d 
667 (2010)). 
Here, Plaintiffs urge collateral estoppel and res judicata are not applicable because in 
order for either doctrine to apply, a "final judgment" must have been entered in a previous case. 
See Bhindi Bros. v. Patel, 275 Ga. App. 143,144,619 S.E.2d 814,816 (2005) ("[I]n order for res 
judicata to apply, a final judgment must have been entered in the prior suit") (citing Atlanta J's. 
Inc. v. Houston Foods, Inc., 237 Ga. App. 415, 418(2), 514 S.E.2d 216 (1999)); Mallov v. State, 
293 Ga. 350, 353-54, 744 S.E.2d 778, 782 (2013) ("Collateral estoppel 'means simply that when 
an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue 
cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit"') (quoting Ashe v. 
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 ( 1970)). A judgment is generally 
"final when it disposes of the entire controversy, leaving nothing for the trial court to do in the 
case." Bhindi Bros., 275 Ga. App. at 144 (citation omitted). Because Souza voluntarily dismissed 
the 2015 Action pursuant to O.C.G.A. §9-11-41 (a) after it was remanded by the Court of 
Appeals, Plaintiffs argue there was no "final judgment" and, thus, res judicata and collateral 
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estoppel are inapplicable. See O.C.G.A. §9-11-41 (a)(3) ("A dismissal under this subsection is 
without prejudice, except that the filing of a second notice of dismissal operates as an 
adjudication upon the merits"). 
However, in Roth v. Gulf Atl. Media of Georgia, Inc., 244 Ga. App. 677, 536 S.E.2d 577 
(2000) the Court of Appeals of Georgia held that a partial grant of summary judgment that is not 
expressly entered as a "final judgment" but which is appealed and affirmed on appeal may have 
preclusive effect even when the lawsuit is subsequently voluntarily dismissed. In Roth, the 
plaintiff had previously sued his employer and its majority shareholder in superior court alleging 
fraudulent inducement and breach of contract. kL_ at 677. The superior court granted summary 
judgment to the employer and majority shareholder on the fraudulent inducement claims, finding 
the plaintiff could not demonstrate an essential element of fraud-justifiable reliance. Id. That 
judgment was affirmed on appeal. Id. After the case was remanded for adjudication of the 
remaining claims, the superior court dismissed the breach of contract claim as asserted against 
the majority shareholder. Id. at 678. The plaintiff then voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit without 
prejudice under O.C.G.A. §9-11-41 (a) but later refiled the same fraud and breach of contract 
claims against the employer and majority shareholder in state court. Id. 
In affirming the state court's grant of summary judgment to the employer and majority 
shareholder on res judicata grounds, the appellate court noted: 
It is true that under O.C.G.A. § 9-1 l-54(b) a judgment as to one or more 
but fewer than all of the claims or parties is not a finaJ judgment and lacks 
res judicata effect unless the trial court expressly directs the entry of a 
final judgment and determines that there is no just reason for delaying the 
finality of the judgment. But if a grant of partial summary judgment is not 
made final under O.C.G.A. § 9-l l-54(b), the party against whom 
summary judgment was granted has the option to either appeal or not 
appeal at that time. And if the party chooses to appeal, then the appellate 
decision 011 the summary judgment ruling is binding under 0. C. G.A. §9- 
11-60(h). 
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Id. at 679.41 The Court of Appeals held that, because the plaintiff chose to appeal the superior 
court's grant of summary judgment on the fraudulent inducement claims and the judgment was 
affirmed on appeal, "th]e] (appellate) court's affirmance of the summary judgment ruling 
constitute[ d) a binding final adjudication that prevent[ ed] [the plaintiffJ from relitigating the 
fraud claims" in the subsequent state court action. Id. at 680. 
Here, because Souza appealed this Court's summary judgment ruling in the 2015 Action 
and that judgment was affirmed on appeal, that ruling has a preclusive effect with respect to 
claims and issues that were actually adjudicated on the merits as between Souza and Berberian 
and their "privies." 
2. Unjust Enrichment, Quantum Meruit, and Promissory Estoppel 
For the same reasons set forth in Part C(2)(a) and (b), supra, the Court finds questions of 
material fact preclude summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs' claims against Berberian for 
unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and promissory estoppel. Notably, the unjust enrichment and 
quantum meruit claims survived summary judgment in the 2015 Action and promissory estoppel 
was never asserted in the 2015 Action. Further, those claims do not depend on the existence of 
any enforceable contractual obligations. Defendant Berberian's Motion for Summary Judgment 
on the unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and promissory estoppel claims is DENIED. 
3. Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
For the same reasons set forth in Part C(2)(c), supra, the Court finds Plaintiffs' claim for 
breach of fiduciary duty against Berberian fails as a matter of law. Moreover, in the 2015 Action 
Souza asserted a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against Berberian on many of the same 
41 O.C.G.A. §9-1 l-60(h) provides: "The law of the case rule is abolished; but generally judgments and orders 
shall not be set aside or modified without just cause and, in setting aside or otherwise modifying judgments and 
orders, the court shall consider whether rights have vested thereunder and whether or not innocenr parties would be 
injured thereby; provided, however, that any ruling by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals in a case shall be 
binding in all subsequent proceedings in that case in the lower court and in the Supreme Court or the Court of 
Appeals as the case may be." 
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grounds as are raised in this action and summary judgment was granted and affirmed on that 
claim such that Plaintiffs are barred from reasserting it in this action against Berberian. 
Berberian's Motion for Summary Judgment on the breach of fiduciary duty claim is GRANTED. 
4. Fraud 
In order to prove fraud, the plaintiff must establish five elements: (1) a false 
representation by a defendant, (2) scienter, (3) intention to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain 
from acting, (4) justifiable reliance by plaintiff, and (5) damage to plaintiff." Engelman v. 
Kessler, 340 Ga. App. 239, 246, 797 S.E.2d 160, 166 (2017) (citing Sun Nurseries, Inc. v. Lake 
Erma. LLC, 316 Ga.App. 832,835 (1), 730 S.E.2d 556 (2012). 
Here, Plaintiffs allege that during the parties' discussions and negotiations Berberian 
knowingly made false representations and omitted material facts about the "deal" being 
negotiated. Souza claims he relied upon those representations and omission in agreeing to 
introduce Berberian and Gallups and in continuing to help Defendants develop and roll out the 
business UAS/Pinnacle/ENT Institute. Although Souza amended his pleadings in the 2015 
Action to assert a fraud claim after the case was remanded by the Court of Appeals, insofar as 
there was no adjudication of that claim in the prior action it is not barred by res judicata. Further, 
having considered the entire record the Court finds that questions of material fact preclude 
summary judgment on the fraud claim including whether there was any reliance by Souza on 
those representations and omissions and whether any such reliance was justifiable. Thus, 
Defendant Berberian's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED with respect to the fraud 
claim. 
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5. Attorney's Fees and Punitive Damages 
Insofar as substantive claims remain for adjudication against Berberian, including a claim 
for fraud, Plaintiffs' "derivative" claims for attorney's fees and costs and punitive damages also 
survive. See Racette, 318 Ga. App. at 181; DaimlerChrysler Motors Co., 294 Ga. App. at 52(5). 
Thus, summary judgment is DENIED to Defendant Berberian on the claims for attorney's fees 
and costs and punitive damages. 
CONCLUSION 
Given all of the above, the Court hereby: GRANTS summary judgment to Defendant 
Gallups on all claims asserted against him; GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART 
summary judgment to Defendant ENT Institute as set forth above; and GRANTS IN PART and 
DEN1ES IN PART summary judgment to Defendant Berberian as set forth above. 
Since claims remain in this action, the parties are ORDERED to submit a fully 
consolidated pretrial order within thirty (30) days of the entry of this order. Upon receipt of the 
pretrial order, the Court will enter a pretrial scheduling order that will govern the final 
adjudication of the remaining claims. 
SO ORDERED this I\~ day ofMarch, 2019. 
ETHE. LONG, SENIOR JUDGE 
Fulton County Superior Court 
Business Case Division 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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